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Abstract. The lowest temptation level (T = 1) is considered a trivial case for the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Here, we show that this statement is true only for a very particular case, where the players interact with
only one player. Otherwise, if the players interact with more than one player, the system presents the
same possible behaviors observed for T > 1. In the steady state, the system can reach the cooperative,
chaotic or defective phases, when adopting the Darwinian Evolutionary Strategy and the cooperative or
quasi-regular phases, adopting the Pavlovian Evolutionary Strategy.
PACS. 02.50.Le Game theory – 07.05.Tp Computer modeling and simulation – 87.23.Kg Evolution in
biology
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), two players confront
themselves and each one can either cooperate (C) or de-
fect (D). Under mutual cooperation, both players receive
a payoff R (reward). If both are defectors, their payoff is
P (punishment). When a player cooperates and the other
defects, they receive S (sucker) and T (temptation), re-
spectively [1]. The dilemma appears under the conditions
T > R > P > S and R > (S + T )/2 [1]. In these circum-
stances, the best individual strategy is to defect, because
it assures a higher payoff than cooperation, independently
of the opponent decision (Nash equilibrium). However, the
best global strategy is cooperation.
When PD is played repeatedly, it is called Iterated
Prisoner Dilemma (IPD). A computer tournament was
proposed by Axelrod in the 80’s [2,3] to compare different
strategies playing the IPD. The winner strategy was tit-
for-tat (TFT), where a player cooperates in the first round
and subsequently, copies the opponent last round action.
It has only one time step memory. Cooperation emergence
as a stable strategy made the PD popular [4].
In a spatial PD game, all players play against their
neighbors, they sum the payoffs and update their states.
The rules to update the states depend on the adopted
strategy. Here, we consider two deterministic strategies
based on the total payoff: Darwinian Evolutionary Strat-
egy (DES) [5,6] and Pavlovian Evolutionary Strategy (PES) [7,8,9,10,11,12,13].
A player adopting the DES uses the strategy of copying
the best adapted player state (fittest player) among the
interacting players. This behavior can be compared to the
Darwin’s natural selection principle, the “survival of the
fittest” [14]. The PES is a win-stay, lose-shift strategy [15].
Defined an aspiration level (AL) [11], a player compares
his/her total payoff to it. If the total payoff is greater
than AL, the player keeps his/her current state, other-
wise switches it. This behavior can be thought as: “never
change a winning team”.
The main variable in the PD problem is the temptation
payoff. Same temptation values yield a total payoff to the
players that force they to switch their states, which cause
a phase transition. These values of temptation are the
critical temptation values and they depend on the adopted
strategy, on the system connectivity and the neighborhood
configuration [15]. Here, we only consider the particular
case T = 1, the lowest temptation level to defect. We
choose the following payoffs: for DES: R = 1 and P = S =
0; and for PES: R = 1, P = −R = −1 and S = −T = −1.
The AL for the PES is to receive a positive payoff. When
a cooperator plays against a defector, if T = 1 and R = T ,
both have the same payoff. Due to this result, a previous
study [16] has considered, explicitly, T = 1 as a trivial
case (other authors do not even mention this case), since
players do not switch their states during time evolution.
Meanwhile, this statement is true only for players using
the DES in the case of each player interacting with only
one neighbor. If players play with more than one neighbor,
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they can switch their states and in fact they do. In the
following we show that T = 1 is indeed a non-trivial case.
Now, consider players, located in the sites of a one-
dimensional lattice (with periodic boundary conditions).
Each player can cooperate or defect, and play the IPD
with z neighbors (coordination number). If z is even, the
player interacts with z/2 players to the right-hand side
and z/2 to the left one. If z is odd, player self-interacts
(plays against his/her own state) and with (z− 1)/2 play-
ers on each side. The system order parameter is the asymp-
totic proportion of cooperators, ρ∞. This geometry has
been studied in Ref. [15,17,18] and gives the same results
for critical temptation values as for regular lattices, once it
only depends on the connectivity of the system. It also al-
lows to numerically explore the whole parameter space [18]
which permitted us to detect a new phase (quasi-regular)
for the Pavlov strategy [15].
The variable θi represents the i-th player state, if θi =
0, the player defects and if θi = 1, the player cooperates.
If a player interacts with more than one player, the to-
tal payoff (sum of all his/her payoffs per interaction) is
given by [15]: G
(z; ci)
i (θi) = Tci + P (z − ci), for θi = 1,
and G
(z; ci)
i (θi) = Rci + S(z − ci), for θi = 0. The quan-
tities T , R, P and S are the PD payoff values; z is the
system connectivity; and ci is the number of cooperators
in the i-th player neighborhood. During time evolution,
players can organize themselves in well defined cooper-
ative or defective clusters, which define the borders be-
tween them. Clusters interact among themselves, estab-
lishing the invasion processes. In a cooperative cluster,
inner members have a higher payoff than in the defective
ones, and the payoff differences along borders are more
remarkable. On one hand, for players adopting the DES,
these payoff differences along the border region are essen-
tial to determine these player states switching due to the
payoffs comparison. Whereas, in large clusters, inner play-
ers do not switch their states, since every player has the
same state and payoff. Cooperators/defectors invade de-
fective/cooperative clusters from the cluster border play-
ers [17]. On the other hand, if they are adopting PES, the
switching process can take place in any location of the
cluster. Inner players can switch their states, once they
do not compare their payoffs with the neighboring ones,
but compare with their own aspiration level. If the pay-
offs do not achieve this aspiration level, they switch their
states [15].
We have performed numerical simulations, where each
simulation consists on distributing the players in a one-
dimensional lattice with L agents, out of which ρ0L are
randomly set as cooperators and the remaining ones as
defectors. Then agents play the IPD with z neighbors
and update their states according to the adopted strategy.
This process is repeated till the system reaches a steady
state. To calculate the asymptotic proportion of coopera-
tors mean value and its standard deviation, we repeat the
simulation for M = 1000 realizations, with different ini-
tial configurations of cooperators for each parameters set.
We present the results of the parameter space exhaustive
exploration, ρ∞(T = 1; ρ0; z), and the associated stan-
dard deviation, SD, for players adopting the DES and the
PES. The exhaustive exploration is done using the follow-
ing ranges and steps: 0 ≤ ρ0 ≤ 1 with ∆ρ0 = 0.1 steps
and 2 ≤ z ≤ 30 with integer values.
The state switching processes drive the system to a
steady state that defines a phase [15,17,18]. In a naive
analysis, when the system exhibits a cooperators major-
ity (ρ∞ > 0.5), we say that the system is in the coopera-
tive phase. If a defectors majority occurs (ρ∞ < 0.5), we
have the defective phase. Also, a chaotic phase can occur,
characterized by a high sensitivity to small change in the
initial configuration, leading to large ρ∞ fluctuations. As
it is shown in the Ref. [15], in the quasi-regular phase,
the proportion of cooperators oscillates around ρ∞ ∼ 0.5,
with many players switching their states at each time step,
even in the steady state. In cooperative, defective and
quasi-regular phases, the ρ∞ fluctuations (standard de-
viation) are very small, contrasting to the chaotic ones.
For a system, which players adopt the DES, the coop-
erative, defective or chaotic phases may occur; if players
adopt the PES, the possible outcomes are: the cooperative
or quasi-regular phases [15].
To compare our results, consider T = 1 as a trivial
case. As currently believed, in this case, all players do not
switch their states during time evolution and the system
keeps its initial configuration (ρ∞ = ρ0) for every param-
eters set. For T = 1, the ρ∞ surface, as function of ρ0 and
z, is a plan depicted in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1: If T = 1 was a trivial case, the ρ∞ surface, as
function of ρ0 and z, is not altered from the initial config-
uration due time evolution.
The ρ∞(T = 1; ρ0; z) surfaces, for DES, and its stan-
dard deviation are depicted in Fig. 2. Figs. 2a (without
self-interaction, even z values) and 2b (with self-interaction,
odd z values) show that players switch theirs states, be-
cause ρ∞ does not form the plan as the one displayed
in Fig. 1. Players have not kept their initial states during
system evolution. Players switch their states, because they
compare the total payoff, not the payoff per play of each
pair of players. Observing the systems, with and without
self-interaction, one can notice that the cooperative phase
is more prominent than the defective one in both cases.
However, self-interaction increases the cooperative phase
in comparison to the absence of self-interaction. Once the
players self-interact, a cooperator has at least one positive
payoff and a defector has a null payoff. In this way, self-
interaction is advantageous to cooperator and they can
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be replicated more easily (higher payoff) and cooperation
emerges in the system. Figs. 2c and 2d show the graph-
ics of the fluctuations of ρ∞ for even and odd z values,
respectively. In these graphics, if SD ∼ 0.5, the system
presents the chaotic phase in that region of the parameter
space. For T = 1, the chaotic phase is present only for
even z values, without self-interaction (see Fig. 2c). The
chaotic phase occurs between the cooperative and defec-
tive phases (see the cliff in Fig. 2a) as ρ0 decreases. When
players self-interact, cooperation increases and the chaotic
phase does not appear at all(see Fig. 2d).
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Fig. 2: Surfaces of ρ∞ and their fluctuations as a function
of ρ0 and z, for T = 1. Players adopt the DES. Specifically,
(a) ρ∞ for even z values, with z = [2; 30] (without self-
interaction); (b) ρ∞ for odd z values, with z = [3; 29]
(with self-interaction); (c) fluctuation of ρ∞ displayed in
(a); (d) the same for (b). Projections of ρ∞ in the plan
ρ∞ρ0: (e) blue: z = 2, green: z = 4, red: z = 8, cyan:
z = 16, magenta: z = 28, yellow: z = 30, black: result if
players did not change their states. (f) blue: z = 3, green:
z = 5, red: z = 9, cyan: z = 19, magenta: z = 27, yellow:
z = 29, black color: trivial case.
The projection of ρ∞(1; ρ0; z) on the plan ρ∞ρ0 rep-
resents ρ∞ as a function of ρ0 for different z values. Fig. 2e
displays these projections for even z values (without self-
interaction) and Fig. 2f, the projections for odd ones (with
self-interaction). In Fig. 2f, the cooperation emerges for
ρ0 ≥ 0.1, due the self-interaction presence, which increases
the cooperators payoff, as explained above. In Fig. 2e, ρ∞
values can be greater or lower than the “expected” value:
ρ∞ = ρ0. For ρ0 < 0.4, ρ∞ < ρ0 and SD ∼ 0.5. On one
hand, if the cooperator proportion is small (ρ0 ∼ 0), these
cooperators receive several null payoffs (due to the interac-
tions with defectors) and their payoffs decrease, while the
defector payoffs increase, consequently cooperators switch
their states and cooperation does not emerge. On the other
hand, when ρ0 > 0.4 more cooperators exist in the sys-
tem in the beginning of the time evolution. Cooperators
playing against themselves receive a positive payoff. The
total payoff of cooperators become greater than the one
of defectors that confronted others defectors, so these co-
operators do not switch. But, the defectors, despite of ex-
ploiting these cooperators, can confront others defectors,
which lead to a decrease of their total payoff, leading them
to switch their states, which drive the system to the defec-
tive phase. Meanwhile, for z = 2, it occurs one exception,
in this case the cooperation does not emerge, because co-
operator j, that plays against cooperator i and defector
k, has a payoff Gj = 1. If defector k interacts with other
cooperator beyond j (remember that z = 2), he/she has
a payoff Gk = 2, then the cooperator j copies the player
k state. In this way, defection becomes the main behavior
of the players, raising the defective phase. This allows us
to conclude that higher connectivity favors cooperation in
this case, because it increases the chance of a cooperator
to interact with other cooperators.
For the PES, the payoff of two defectors, when play-
ing against themselves, is negative (P = −T = −1). This
is enough for both to switch their states, but they still
can explore cooperators of their neighborhoods. If even
exploiting the neighbors, their payoffs do not become pos-
itive, they switch their states and cooperation emerges in
the system. The ρ∞(T = 1; ρ0; z) surfaces, for PES, and
the associated standard deviation are depicted in Fig. 3.
Figs. 3a (without self-interaction, even z values) and 3b
(with self-interaction, odd z values) are very different from
those observed for the DES (Fig. 2a and 2b). Nevertheless,
they also confirm that proportion of cooperators evolves as
time goes by, for T = 1. Here, the majority of the players
cooperate in whole the parameter space with the exception
of z = 2 and z = 4 (without self-interaction, see Fig. 3a),
where the quasi-regular phase occurs, with ρ∞ ∼ 0.5.
Notice that ρ∞ decreases as z increases, with a stiffness
more pronounced in the presence of self-interaction, be-
cause defectors always receive a null payoff due his/her
self-interaction. Also, a ρ∞ symmetry occurs, regarding
the ρ0 = 1/2, because for ρ0 = β, while rL players re-
ceive a positive payoff, (1−r)L players receives a negative
one, whether, ρ0 = 1 − β, (1 − r)L players receive a pos-
itive payoff, rL players receives a negative one, where r
is a arbitrary proportion of players which depends on the
distribution of the players in each time step [15]. Figs.
3c and 3d show the SD for even and odd z values, re-
spectively. In these graphics, the small SD values show
the non-existence of the chaotic phase. Only the quasi-
regular (z = {2; 4}) phase has a slightly higher value.
4 Marcelo Alves Pereira, Alexandre Souto Martinez: Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length
Fig. 3e displays the projections of ρ∞ on the plan ρ∞ρ0
for even z values (without self-interaction), and Fig. 3f for
odd ones (with self-interaction). These plots demonstrate
that the cooperative phase is dominant. The quasi-regular
phase occurs only for z = 2 and z = 4. The proportion
of cooperators is below than the “expected” only in the
quasi-regular phase.
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Fig. 3: Surfaces of ρ∞ and their fluctuations as a function
of ρ0 and z, for T = 1. Players adopt the PES. Specifically,
(a) ρ∞ for even z values, with z = [2; 30] (without self-
interaction); (b) ρ∞ for odd z values, with z = [3; 29]
(with self-interaction); (c) fluctuation of ρ∞ displayed in
(a); (d) the same for (b). Projections of ρ∞ in the plan
ρ∞ρ0: (e) blue: z = 2, green: z = 4, red: z = 8, cyan:
z = 16, magenta: z = 28, yellow: z = 30, black: result if
players did not change their states. (f) blue: z = 3, green:
z = 5, red: z = 9, cyan: z = 19, magenta: z = 27, yellow:
z = 29, black color: trivial case.
The results presented here show that, for T = 1, the
system is not static and trivial, as previously supposed,
when players play the IPD with more than one neighbor
(z > 1). On one hand, if players adopt the DES, cooper-
ative, defective and chaotic phases may be present. The
chaotic phase appears only for even z values (without self-
interaction). The more astonishing result is the coopera-
tive phase (ρ∞ ∼ 1), that is present for ρ0 > 0.5, without
self-interaction and for ρ0 > 0 with it. On the other hand,
adopting the PES, as z increases, ρ∞(1; ρ; z ≫ 1) de-
creases with the exception z = {2; 4}, with a decrease
more pronounced when the self-interaction is present. For
z = {2; 4}, system presents the quasi-regular phase, which
we have firstly pointed out in Ref. [15]. The symmetry of
ρ∞ can be explained by equivalence arguments. Cooper-
ation emerges even when cooperators and defectors have
the same payoff in the IPD. The increase in the connec-
tivity favors cooperation for the DES, but it decreases the
cooperation for the PES. The initial proportion of coop-
erators is not a relevant parameter in this problem, it has
less influence in the results than the others parameters.
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